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I. INTRODUCTION 
State laws and actions affecting mentally retarded individuals deserve an interme-
diate level of scrutiny by the Supreme Court of the United States. Use of such scrutiny 
is appropriate when reviewing actions of the state which have a singular impact upon 
an identifiable segment of society. Where a group of individuals is uniquely affected by 
law, the Court's closer inquiry of the facts ensures better protection of the rights of the 
affected individuals. Admittedly, a state may be justified in isolating a group for the 
legitimate purposes of protecting or providing assistance when such persons are unable 
to do so for themselves. When individuals bear immutable, identifiable characteristics 
and have been "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to 
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from 
the majoritarian political process,"l the Supreme Court has used a heightened level of 
scrutiny to determine whether that state action is legitimate. The Court, however, has 
not followed this approach consistently but instead has created precedent which will not 
only confuse courts in future equal protection cases, but also will allow discrimination 
against the mentally retarded to continue. The Supreme Court has developed three 
levels of scrutiny in the area of equal protection.2 Traditionally, under the "rational basis 
test," government action was held constitutional as long as it was reasonable. 3 This 
minimal level of scrutiny was used in the equal protection of economic interests.4 A 
1 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973). 
2 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 
3 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
• Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. 
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stricter scrutiny was developed which upholds government action only if a compelling 
state interest could be shown to justify it.5 "Strict scrutiny" was used when classes, 
identified by their race or nationality, were deprived of "fundamental rights."6 A third 
level of scrutiny, "intermediate scrutiny," also known as "heightened scrutiny," has been 
used only for classes identified by gender or illegitimacy.7 Intermediate scrutiny is in-
tended to be used for review of governmental action which affects specific classes of 
individuals whose characteristics require the state to take their characteristics into con-
sideration to better protect them.s Intermediate scrutiny requires that statutory classifi-
cations serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.9 Intermediate scrutiny allows the state the legislative 
freedom which "strict scrutiny" might not allow, while providing sufficient protection 
for the rights of the affected individuals. 
The Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living CenterlO used the minimum 
"rational basis" level of scrutiny to review a municipal ordinance which violated the equal 
protection of the mentally retarded. The use of minimum scrutiny is inappropriate when 
reviewing state action that affects a class which has immutable characteristics, has been 
subject to a history of discrimination and mistreatment, and lacks the ability to be 
politically effective. I I Since the mentally retarded constitute such a class, the application 
of the minimum level of scrutiny to review state action which affects them is inappro-
priate. Like other minorities, the mentally retarded have been subjected to stereotyped 
assumptions and generalizations which are embedded in the social structure. 12 There-
fore, this note will demonstrate that the Supreme Court should use an intermediate level 
of scrutiny to review governmental action which singularly affects mentally retarded 
citizens. 
II. THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court applies three standards of review when scrutinizing alleged 
violations of equal protection. These standards of review include: strict scrutiny, inter-
mediate scrutiny, and the rational basis test. Strict scrutiny is the standard of review 
which requires the most independent judicial inquiry. Using this test "means that the 
justices will not defer to the decisions of other branches of government but will instead 
independently determine. the degree of the relationship which the classification bears to 
a constitutionally compelling end."13 Here, the government will be required to show a 
'''compelling' ... end - one whose value is so great that it justifies the limitation of 
fundamental constitutional values."I4 The Court will only employ strict scrutiny when 
the government's classification is based upon a trait "which itself seems to contravene 
5 See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
6 See U.S. v. Carolene Product Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
7 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18; Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 (1976). 
8 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
9Id. 
10 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed. 2d 313 (1985). 
11 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. 
12 Linn, Involuntary Sterilization - A Constitutional Awakening to Fundamental Human Rights, 2 
AMICUS 34 (1977). 
13 NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 16, § I, at 591. 
14Id. at 592. 
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established constitutional principles so that any use of the classification may be deemed 
'suspect'."15 Historically, the Court has used strict scrutiny for those laws which classify 
persons on the basis of their race or national origin. 16 Strict scrutiny allows the Court to 
dissect state action involving race or national origin and to evaluate both the means and 
the ends desired by the government. The Court must determine that the means and 
ends are constitutionally sound or the state action or legislation will be nullified. 
Intermediate scrutiny, also called heightened scrutiny, is probably the most confusing 
of the standards of review used by the Court. It is a form of independent judicial review 
but its analysis is not quite as rigorous as strict scrutiny. Initially, intermediate scrutiny 
was applied in cases involving gender-based classifications,I7 but has been extended to 
cases involving illegitimacyl8 and aliens. 19 Under intermediate scrutiny, a state law or 
action will be valid if the government can demonstrate that a classification is "substantially 
related to the achievement of ... [an] important governmental objective."20 Although, 
in some instances the Supreme Court states that it is applying a minimum rationality 
test, the Court is in fact applying an intermediate level of review.21 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has also used the intermediate level of review 
to analyze laws and state actions which violate fundamental constitutional rights.22 The 
resulting decisions, however, increase the confusion. For example, in cases involving the 
fundamental rights to vote2! and to travel,24 the Court has looked for both "important" 
15 [d. 
16 [d. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Ed. is a recent example of Supreme Court strict scrutiny. In 
Wygant, a school board adopted a layoff provision in its collective bargaining agreement to maintain 
a status quo percentage of minority personnel, even in the event of necessary layoffs. [d. at 1845. 
The board adhered to this provision and subsequently laid off non-minority teachers. These teachers 
alleged violations of the equal protection clause. [d. 
The Supreme Court here applied strict scrutiny because "racial and ethnic distinctions of any 
sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." [d. at 1846, 
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)(Powell,'J.». The Court did 
not believe that societal discrimination alone was a sufficient state purpose to justify a racial 
classification; rather, there must be an additional showing of prior discrimination in order to allow 
such remedial action. [d. at 1848. Under strict scrutiny, the means chosen to accomplish the state's 
asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. [d. at 1850. 
The burden to be borne by innocent individuals was too intrusive. The Court held that despite an 
otherwise legitimate purpose, the provision was not tailored narrowly enough to accomplish it and 
was therefore unconstitutional. [d. at 1852. 
17 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
18 See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 259. 
19 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. 
20 Craig, 429 U.S. at 75. 
21 See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3249. 
22 NOWAK, supra note 13, at 593 . 
.. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
24 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 106 
S.Ct. 2317 (1986), is a case in which the Court uses heightened scrutiny. The case, however, involves 
the alleged violation of the right to travel. The precedential right to travel cases have been reviewed 
through the years using all three levels of scrutiny. Hence, despite what level of review the Court 
announces it will use, that announcement will in reality provide little precedential value to indicate 
the standard of review used in cases of this nature. Nonetheless, analysis of the Soto-Lopez case will 
illustrate the meaning of intermediate scrutiny. 
The state of New York, through its constitution and state law granted civil service employment 
preference to New York residents who were honorably discharged veterans of the United States 
armed services, who had served during wartime and had been residents of New York when they 
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and "compelling" govermental ends. This suggests that the Court is simultaneously using 
both intermediate and strict scrutiny. The confusion in this standard is precisely the 
problem with the current standard of review which the Court uses in connection with 
the mentally retarded. 
Traditionally, the rational basis test has been that level of scrutiny which gave the 
greatest deference to legislative prerogatives. Primarily used for state economic regula-
tion, the Court will use a "lenient standard of rationality when applying this test."25 
Under this standard a statute will be upheld "if a legislature could have reasonably 
concluded that the challenged classification would promote a legitimate state purpose."26 
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 
A. Mistreatment and Discrimination 
Throughout history the causes of mental retardation have been misunderstood.27 
This misunderstanding has led to discrimination and mistreatment of the mentally 
entered the military service. Id. at 2319. Appellees met all criteria, except they had been residents 
of Puerto Rico when they joined the military. They claimed that the state had violated the equal 
protection clause and their constitutionally protected right to travel. Since the "creation of different 
classes of residents raise[d] equal protection concerns ... and where a state law infringe[d] upon a 
constitutionally protected right, ... [the Court] intensified equal protection scrutiny of that law." 
Id. at 2321. 
The Court closely analyzed the benefits of which the appellees had been deprived. The Court 
determined the benefits which the appellees had been deprived were permanent and substantial. 
Thus, the Court concluded that the appellees had indeed been penalized. Id. at 2324. The Court 
stated that the justifications given by the state failed to withstand even heightened scrutiny because 
all state interests could be achieved without the prior residence requirement. Id. The Court rec-
ognized that the "long standing policy to compensate veterans with advantages over non-veterans 
might be deemed compelling," but nonetheless, the classification New York created between resident 
and non-resident enlistees was not relevant. Id. at 2325. 
25 Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195 (1982). 
26Id. at 196. Recently, the Court used the rational basis test in Lyng v. Castillo, 106 S.Ct. 2727 
(1986), to uphold the eligibility and benefit levels of the Federal Food Stamp Program. These levels 
are determined on a "household" rather than an "individual" basis. Id. at 2728. The statutory term 
"household" was amended in 1981 and 1982 to treat parents, children and siblings living together 
as a single household. Id. at 2729. Appellees claimed that the statutory distinction between parents, 
children and siblings, and all other groups of individuals violated the guarantee of equal protection. 
[d. at 2729. 
The Court found that the district court had improperly applied heightened scrutiny because 
"close relatives are not a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' class." Id. Furthermore, the classification did 
not burden a fundamental right, thus "the legislative classification itself is rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest." /d. at 2730. 
The Court found a rational basis in the "legislature's recognition of the potential for mistake 
and fraud and the cost-ineffectiveness of case-by-case verification of claims that individuals ate as 
separate households." Id. at 2730-31. The Court also found that "Congress could reasonably 
determine that close relatives sharing a home ... tend to purchase and prepare meals together 
while distant relatives and unrelated individuals might not be so inclined." Id. at 2731. Although 
close relatives may be just as honest as other food stamp recipients, "the potential for mistaken or 
misstated claims of separate dining in order to receive a greater share of benefits would be greater 
... because a greater percentage ... prepare meals jointly." [d. at 2731-32. 
27 Gould, Procreation: A Choice for the Mentally Retarded, 23 WASHBURN L. J. 359 n.4 (1984). 
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retarded.28 During the colonial period of the United States, the mentally retarded were 
among those accused of witchcraft.29 Even after the witchscares of the late 1600's, the 
mentally retarded were still regarded as evil or innately inferior. 30 
It was not until the nineteenth century that physicians began to do research on 
mental retardation,31 Using newly created intelligence tests, scientists classified levels of 
mental retardation. s2 The interest in genetics and heredity which expanded in the early 
twentieth century was devastating to the mentally retarded.33 Genetic studies conducted 
at this time concluded that all forms of mental retardation were hereditary.34 This 
incorrect assumption was generally supported by both professionals and society until the 
1940's and 1950's when advances were made in understanding the causes of mental 
retardation.35 
The American Psychiatric Association and the American Association on Mental 
Deficiency currently define mental retardation as "sub-normal or sub-average general 
intellectual functioning."36 There are at present approximately 250 known causes of 
mental retardation.37 In seventy-five to eighty-five percent of the cases of mental retar-
dation, however, the specific causes are unknown. 38 The remaining twenty-five to fifteen 
percent have underlying causes which are varied and complex.39 Genetic factors are 
believed to be responsible for only a small percentage of mental defects.4o No one specific 
biological factor, however, is known to account for retardation. 41 Recent medical research 
has shown that environmental conditions can also produce mental retardation.42 Intel-
lectual and emotional deprivation, physical abuse, pre-natal causes like rubella or PKU 
(phenylketonuria), have been linked to at least ten percent of the mentally retarded 
population.43 
28Id. at n.5. See also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL DEFICIEN<;:Y, CONSENT HANDBOOK 
(1977); WOODY, LE;GAL ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION: A SEARCH FOR RELIABILITY 10-14 (1974). 
29 SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION 93 (1983). 
30Id. 
31Id. at 94. 
32 Id. at 1l0. 
33 Id. at 149. 
34Id. at 213. 
35 Accordingly, a concept as amorphous as "intelligence" fosters debate over the definition of 
mental retardation. See WOODY, supra note 28, at n.13. 
'6Id. at n.20. 
37 Id. 
38 15 KOPELMAN & MOSKOP, ETHICS AND MENTAL RETARDATION 250 (1984). 
39 See Shaman, Persons Who are Mentally Retarded: Their Right to Marry and Have Children, 12 FAM. 
L. Q. 61, 67 n.36 (1978). 
40 Bender, A Geneticist's Viewpoint Towards Sterilization, 2 AMICUS 45, 47 (1977). Several studies 
have shown that the mildly retarded individual has a high risk of reproducing a similarly affected 
child. However, at least 80% of mentally impaired individuals have non-mentally impaired parents. 
Id. See DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1949). 
41 STERN, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN GENETICS (3d ed. 1973). 
42 Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded: Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 
N .C.L.REV. 943, 950 n.43 (1982) (citing 5-6 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 332 (3d ed. 1980)). 
43 Shaman, supra note 39, at 3. See also 1 ENNIS, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 
19-20 (1973). Down's syndrome and other less common syndromes have also been linked to mental 
retardation. See also, KOPELMAN AND MOSKOP, supra note 38, at 64; Bouchard, Familial Studies of 
Intelligence: A Review, 212 SCIENCE 1055-59 (1981). 
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Classification of the mentally retarded under the Stanford-Binet IQ test44 is as 
follows: "borderline" fall within the 68-83 range, "mild" from 52-67, "moderate" from 
36-51, "severe" from 20-35 and below 20, "profound. "45 The closest non-retarded clas-
sification of intelligence is "dull-normal." In most situations, it is very difficult to distin-
guish between a dull-normal individual and one who is a borderline mentally retarded 
individual. 46 It is estimated that six million Americans, three percent of the population, 
can be classified as mentally retarded.47 Approximately five million individuals function 
in the 50-70 IQ range, and can benefit from special education or training.48 Since there 
are many contributing causes and several levels of mental retardation, intermediate 
scrutiny is necessary to prevent over-inclusion or under-inclusion of mentally retarded 
individuals by state action which might affect them. Differences among the mentally 
retarded may require individualized treatment, and this might only be discerned through 
the use of closer judicial scrutiny. 
The mentally retarded, like many groups who are considered "different" or "infe-
rior," have been subjected to a history of discrimination and mistreatment.49 Early 
American history shows a few instances of charitable acts for the mentally retarded, but 
on the whole, they retained their position of inferiority. 50 If unable to work, the mentally 
ill or retarded were usually placed in jail.5l Government attempts to institutionalize the 
mentally retarded were both inadequate and deplorable. In 1727, Connecticut authorized 
the first house of correction for "persons under distraction and unfit to go at large, 
whose friends do not take care for their safe confinement."52 America's first mental ward 
was created in 1751 by Benjamin Franklin in a Pennsylvania hospital. 53 Although these 
efforts were seemingly beneficial to the mentally retarded, the facilities were uninhabit-
able.54 Often the residents were chained or handcuffed, or their keepers would place 
them on public display for a small fee.55 When practicable, the mentally retarded were 
cared for at home, but during the 1800's, the practice of "bidding out" a mentally 
retarded individual was often used.56 Bidding out involved paying the lowest bidder to 
care for the mentally retarded. Accordingly, this often led to exploitation and low 
standards of care of the mentally retarded who were subjected to terrible conditions, 
confinement, and physical abuse.57 
Although progress was made during the latter half of the nineteenth century, mental 
retardation was still seen as an "evil" and steps were taken to prevent transmitting it to 
44Id. 
45Id. at 63 n.25. 
46 Bender, supra note 40, at 46. 
47Id. 
48 Shaman, supra note 39, at 64. 
49Id. 
50 Bender, supra note 40, at 46. 
51 Shaman, supra note 39, at 68 n.26. See also Gould, supra note 27, at 360 n.13 who lists several 
articles which discuss the social prejudices toward the mentally retarded. 
52 SCHEERENBERGER, supra note 29, at 94. 
53 Id. at 95. 
54Id. 
55Id. at 100. 
56Id. Communities built almshouses for the poor in which the mentally retarded were also 
placed. Conditions there, however, were not an improvement. Dorothea Dix, a reformer of the 
nineteenth century, described incidents ofthe mentally retarded in chains and oftheir imprisonment 
in small rooms or jail cells. 
57Id. at 101. 
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future generations. Large overcrowded institutions became more prevalent. 58 Institutions 
which were built at first for educational purposes were soon used to prevent the mentally 
retarded from reproducing. 59 Since mentally retarded women were more vulnerable, 
special care was taken to segregate them in institutio~s such as the New York Asylum 
for Adult Imbecile Women built in 1878.60 H. Knight, one of the founders of the 
American Association on Mental Deficiency stated, "we owe it not only to the adult 
imbecile herself, but also to humanity and the world at large, to guard in every possible 
way against the abuse and increase of the [mentally retarded] class."61 Moreover, heredity 
studies prompted increased support for sterilizing the "socially unfit" to prevent their 
reproduction.62 The American Breeders Association included the mentally retarded in 
their list of groups who should, if possible, "be eliminated from the human stock."63 A 
writer of the period expressed the common view: "feeble-minded women are almost 
invariably immoral, and if at large usually become carriers of venereal disease or give 
birth to children who are as defective as themselves. "64 
Many professionals in psychology believed that marriage of the mentally retarded 
should be restricted as a means of preventing the mentally retarded from reproducing.65 
Eventually thirty nine states passed laws which prohibited and annulled marriage among 
the mentally retarded.66 Advocates of sterilization, thought these laws ineffective because 
the mentally retarded would be able to reproduce regardless of marriage laws.67 
During the twentieth century, states passed many laws restricting the behavior of 
the mentally retarded. For example, many states prohibited the sale of alcohol to the 
mentally retarded and denied them the rights to vote or create contracts.68 Protective 
laws prohibiting the mistreatment or public exhibition of the mentally retarded were, 
however, also enacted which aimed particularly at circuses and carnivals which had 
exploited many retarded and handicapped persons.69 Nonetheless, negative attitudes 
toward mentally retarded persons persisted. By 1940, most states had abandoned re-
strictions on marriage and sterilization as a means of controlling future generations, but 
exceptions existed. In some states mentally retarded persons were sterilized as part of 
the "parole" program of institutions.70 Other states continued to discriminate through 
alternative means. South Dakota had a stringent "control law" which provided for the 
581d. at 123. 
591d. 
6°ld. 
61/d. at 116. 
621d. at 154. 
631d. 
64 Id. 
651d. It was believed that "undesirables" such as the mentally ill, mentally retarded and habitual 
criminals could be eliminated through sterilization programs. See Bligh, Sterilization and the Mentally 
Retarded, 51 A.B.A.]. 1059, 1060 (1965); DAVIES, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT 
(1930); Kendregan, Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: Three Generations of Imbeciles and the 
Constitution of the United States, 43 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123 (1966); O'Hara and Sanks, Eugenic 
Sterilizations, 45 GEO.L.]. 20 (1956); Ross, Sterilization for the Developmentally Disabled: Shedding Some 
Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. V.L. REv. 599 (1981). 
661d. 
67 SCHEERENBERGER, supra note 29, at 245. 
681d. 
691d. 
70 See generally Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.]. 1644 (1979). 
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"identification, registration, adjudication, prevention of marriage and supervision in the 
community of all the feeble-minded in the state."71 A state level agency administered 
this program; determinations of mental retardation were made by a lay board that relied 
upon intelligence test data. 72 
During the 1950's, community services for the mentally retarded increased, but the 
institutionalized mentally retarded continued to receive inadequate care.73 Residents 
were frequently clad in nothing more than diapers and restricted to bed. Treatment 
often meant the use of medication, strait jackets, lock-ups and physical punishment. 74 
Some institutions used maximum security prison-type cells for their more "dangerous" 
residents. 75 Although in the 1960's, institutions were reformed, the "deinstitutionaliza-
tion" of the mentally retarded was not initiated until the 1970's.76 
Unfortunately, poor institutional conditions and mistreatment of mentally retarded 
inmates persists, thereby providing evidence of the need for the courts to use interme-
diate scrutiny to review state-sponsored abuse. 
The abuse [in institutions] is merely a violent manifestation of the equally 
invidious neglect that permeates institutions ... What best defines an insti-
tution ... is its routine. Since institutions demand regularity to function 
smoothly, deviance cannot be tolerated and individual preferences must be 
subordinated to the requirements of the larger group.77 
In many institutions, common activities like using a telephone, having vIsitors and 
sending unopened letters are restricted. Fundamental freedoms of religion and travel 
are often curtailed in institutions. In addition, inmates are often subject to unreasonable 
searches, medical treatment without their consent and the confiscation of their property 
and money.78 Deviation from the routine can result not only in the loss of privileges but 
also the implementation of restrictive or harmful penalties such as physical or chemical 
restraint. 79 Lack of treatment and training harms mentally retarded inmates both phys-
ically and intellectually by causing muscular atrophy and deterioration of verbal skills.80 
Atrocities within mental institutions such as being scalded by water, restrained in strait 
jackets and confined in seclusion for years have been documented in judicial opinions.81 
71ld. 
72ld. 
73 SCHEERENBERGER, supra note 29, at 312. 
74 I d. at 313. 
75ld. at 314. 
76ld. 
77 ld. at 315. 
78 ld. 
79ld. at 316. 
80 See Note, supra note 70, at 1645. 
81 See the testimony of Dr. Philip Roos in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 
446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.Pa. 1977). Halderman was a class action suit brought on behalf of residents 
of a Pennsylvania state institution for the mentally retarded. The action was brought because of 
overcrowding, understaffing and abuse of the inmates. The institution provided no rehabilitative 
programs and used inhuman physical restraints. See also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 
1974). The Wyatt opinion contained descriptions of grotesque conditions existing in several Alabama 
state hospitals for the mentally retarded. Overcrowding, brutal treatment by aides, and unsanitary 
kitchens and dining areas were among those characteristics listed. ld. at 1310-11. 
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Abuse within state institutions is, in fact, discrimination because it is a state-sponsored 
infringement upon the fundamental rights and freedoms of the mentally retarded. 
Discrimination of the mentally retarded, however, continues today beyond institutional 
walls. Legislation in many states discriminates against the mentally retarded. Most states 
disenfranchise the mentally ill and mentally retarded.82 Some states prohibit the sale of 
firearms, admission to the state national guard or invalidate contracts to which the 
mentally retarded may be a party.83 The mistreatment and discrimination against men-
tally retarded persons both in and out of institutions compels the use of intermediate 
scrutiny. 
B. Political Powerlessness 
I. Lack of Legislative Influence 
The mentally retarded have suffered discrimination and mistreatment similar to 
that of other minority groups which receive intermediate scrutiny from the courts. 
Moreover, the mentally handicapped, like other minorities afforded special protection 
by the courts, are politically powerless due to the nature of their disability. Often the 
mentally retarded may lack understanding or awareness of the legislation which affects 
them; thus, they are dependent upon governmental action. Since the 1960's, there have 
been attempts at the national level to assimilate the mentally retarded into the community. 
Congressional acts have sought to achieve equal employment opportunities84 and to 
ensure the availability of legal advocacy for the mentally retarded.85 Yet, because of 
administrative inertia and insufficient funding, very little substantive change has oc-
curred. Although legal advocacy groups which strive to protect the rights of the mentally 
retarded have developed, interest and aid has generally been provided by the public 
sector.86 These public programs have inadequate financial resources and often direct 
their dollars to other groups such as the elderly or welfare recipients.87 
Congress has authorized the Legal Services Corporation to provide public service 
lawyers and in 1977 amended the act creating the Corporation to require that efforts 
be made to serve the handicapped.88 In 1981, however, the Corporation submitted a 
report to Congress stating that institutionalized persons have a myriad of legal needs 
that go unmet because of a lack of legal resources.89 Local programs to aid the mentally 
82 See Note, supra note 70, at 1645. 
83Id. 
84 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1976). The mentally retarded are exempted 
from the requirement of a competitive exam in applying for federal civil service positions. See 
C.F.R. § 213.3102(t)(1984). 
85 Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976). 
See also Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1978). 
86 Schwartz, Protecting the Rights and Enhancing the Dignity of PeflJJle with Mental Disabilities: Stan-
dards for Effective Legal Advocacy, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 541, 551 (1982). 
87 Herr, The New Clients: Legal Services for MentaUy Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 553, 577-
78 (1979). Legal service assistance priorities are usually established in response to initial client 
contact. A mentally retarded individual may not necessarily have the capacity to take the initiative 
to make that contact. Id. 
88 Legal Services Corporation, Report to Congress: Special Difficulties of Access and Special Unmet 
Legal Problems of the Institutionalized Elderly and Handicapped, 185-91 n.17 (1981). 
89 Schwartz, supra note 86, at 551-53. See also KOPELMAN AND MOSKOP, supra note 38, at 193. 
118 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7: 109 
retarded often receive minimal support to provide adequate representation. Poor co-
ordination among the advocacy programs on behalf of the mentally retarded has resulted 
in wasted efforts, inefficient use of resources and an overall lack of national direction.90 
The mentally retarded cannot effectively protect their own rights and interest groups 
attempting to do so are not consistently effective. Therefore, the mentally retarded 
should be viewed as a distinct group without any, or at least, minimal political power to 
protect their legal or constitutional rights. 
2. Inadequate Consideration by the Supreme Court 
The earliest case involving the mentally retarded, Buck v. Bell,91 upheld the steriliza-
tion of an 18-year-old mentally retarded girl. In Buck, Justice Holmes expressed the 
contemporary attitude of the Court at that time: "[i]t is better for all the world, if instead 
of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 
kind."92 
Since th~t time, the Supreme Court has not shown any indication of a protective 
interest in the mentally retarded. In Stump v. Sparkman,9s an allegedly mentally retarded 
young woman was sterilized in an operation which she understood to be an appendec-
tomy. The Court, however, avoided the issue that the judge granting the sterilization 
order had violated the woman's constitutional right to procreate. Instead, the Court 
decided the case on grounds of judicial immunity and held that the judge was not liable 
for civil damages.94 
In cases where the mentally retarded have prevailed, the Court has nonetheless 
been reluctant to base its decisions on constitutional grounds. For example, in Jackson v. 
Indiana,95 a mentally retarded deaf-mute was charged with two thefts of small amounts, 
but was found incompetent to stand trial because of his handicap. Without determining 
his guilt or innocence, the Indiana court ordered him to be confined by the Department 
of Mental Health until "sane."96 In this case, the Supreme Court found a violation of 
equal protection not because his constitutional right to trial had been violated, but 
because the state of Indiana had used "a more lenient commitment standard and ... a 
more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not 
charged with offenses."97 
The Supreme Court has been cautious in its consideration of the rights of the 
mentally retarded within state civil institutions. In O'Connor v. Donaldson,98 an inmate of 
a mental institution brought action against a Florida state hospital for intentionally and 
maliciously depriving him of his right to liberty because the staff refused to release him. 
Although "responsible persons" had petitioned for his release, the hospital determined 
that the patient needed treatment and could only be released to his parents.99 Instead 
90 Id. 
91 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). This case has not been expressly overruled. 
92/d. at 207. 
9'435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
94/d. at 359. 
95 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
96ld. at 717-19. 
971d. at 730. 
98 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
99 Id. at 568. 
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of stating that the mentally retarded had a constitutional right to freedom, the Court 
stated that: "a state constitutionally cannot confine without more a non-dangerous individ-
ual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing 
and responsible family members or friends"(emphasis added).lOo The lower court held 
that "regardless of the grounds for involuntary civil commitment, a person confined 
against his will has 'a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give 
him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition'."lol The 
Court found "no reason ... to decide whether mentally ill persons ... have a right to 
treatment."I02 
The Court did eventually consider the right to treatment in Youngberg v. Romeo.103 
Here, a mentally retarded individual who had been involuntarily committed to a Penn-
sylvania state institution filed a civil rights suit because of unsafe conditions within the 
institution and a lack of adequate training programs for the inmates. lo4 The Court held 
that the mentally retarded individual had a constitutionally protected right under the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to reasonably safe conditions of con-
finement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate 
training as might be reasonably required by these interests. 105 
The Court has also exercised caution when setting constitutional limits on proce-
dures by which people are committed to institutions. The Supreme Court did discuss 
the standard of proof required for civil commitment of the mentally retarded in Ad-
dington v. Texas. 106 The proper standard for civil commitment, according to the Addington 
Court, is akin to that used in deportation proceedings. To sustain confinement of an 
individual in a mental hospital only "clear and convincing" evidence is required, while 
in criminal cases the more stringent standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is re-
quired. 107 In these cases the Supreme Court did not give the mentally retarded the 
careful scrutiny used for other classes who have been similarly discriminated against or 
mistreated. The Court instead skirted the crucial issues raised by the mentally retarded 
parties and decided the case on other grounds which in effect deprived the mentally 
retarded of their constitutional rights. 
IV. THE CURRENT STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED: CITY OF 
CLEBURNE V. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER 
The Supreme Court must change its analysis of equal protection cases involving the 
mentally retarded. The decision of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center lO8 illustrates 
100Id. at 576. 
101Id. at 572. 
102Id. at 573. 
103 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The respondent was a profoundly retarded thirty-three year old man. 
Unable to be cared for at home, he was placed in a Pennsylavania state school and hospital. He was 
injured on several occasions through his own and others' violence. Thus, he was restrained for 
prolonged periods without provision for any sort of rehabilitative treatment. Id. at 309-12. 
104Id. 
IOSId. at 316. 
106 441 U.S. 418 (1978). The appellant had previously been temporarily committed on several 
occasions to Texas state mental hospitals. His mother filed a petition for his indefinite commitment 
according to Texas law. At the trial the state offered proof to show that the appellant was dangerous 
both to himself and to others. The trial judge instructed the jury to use a "clear and convincing" 
standard rather than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Id. at 420-21. 
107Id. 
108 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed. 2d 313 (1985). 
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this necessity. Indeed, the concurring opinions in Cleburne indicate that under appro-
priate circumstances, the Court may change its approach. Cleburne reiterates the Court's 
reluctance to use more than the minimum standard of review in cases dealing with the 
mentally retarded. In Cleburne, the Supreme Court held that the mentally retarded are 
not a quasi-suspect class. Therefore, the Court used the minimum standard of judicial 
review ordinarily used for economic and social legislation.!09 
The respondent in Cleburne was required to obtain a special permit in order to use 
a building for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded because under 
city zoning ordinances the home would be classified as a "hospital for the feeble-
minded."!l0 After a public hearing, the application for the permit was denied by the city 
council.!!! In district court, the Cleburne Living Center challenged both the validity of 
the ordinance and the denial of the permit, but was unsuccessful.!!2 The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held, however, that the mentally retarded are a "quasi-suspect" class. 
Consequently, the court, using the test of intermediate scrutiny, found that the ordinance 
violated the equal protection clause because it did not achieve the city's stated govern-
mental purposes.l!3 The factors that the court of appeals considered were the history of 
mistreatment and discrimination, the lack of political power, and the immutable char-
acteristics of mental retardation. Although the ordinance did not infringe upon a fun-
damental right, a group home was deemed "very important" to the mentally retarded 
because it integrated them into the community.!!4 The court of appeals found that the 
ordinance did not substantially further a governmental interest. Therefore, the ordi-
nance failed the intermediate scrutiny test and was held invalid by the court.!!5 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the Cleburne appellate 
decision. The Supreme Court agreed that the application of the ordinance violated equal 
protection, but refuted the appellate court's classification of the mentally retarded as a 
quasi-suspect class.!!6 Justice White, writing for the majority, reviewed those cases in 
which the Court had used heightened scrutiny.ll7 According to White, only cases con-
cerning race, alienage or national origin triggered the use of strict scrutiny because such 
characteristics were seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest.!!B 
Moreover, the Court held that strict scrutiny was only necessary when states impinged 
upon constitutional personal rights.!!9 Justice White also discussed those cases in which 
the Court had applied intermediate scrutiny to certain quasi-suspect classes. Under 
109 [d. at 3254. 
110 !d. at 3252. 
111 [d. at 3253. 
112 [d. 
113 City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 196-202 (1984). 
114 [d. at 196 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 190). 
115 [d. at 201-02. 
116 City of Cleburne, 105 S.Ct. at 3255-58. 
117 [d. at 3255 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686 (1973); Mississippi Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982». 
118 [d. (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365 (1971». 
119 [d. (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)(equal access to 
schools); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)(travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 635 
( 1942)(procreation». 
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intermediate scrutiny, state action would be held valid to the extent it was "substantially 
related to a legitimate state interest."12o Justice White noted that this level of scrutiny 
had been used for classifications based upon gender and illegitimacy because those 
characteristics are beyond the individual's control and frequently bear no relation to 
their contribution to society.l2l Additionally, Justice White noted that intermediate scru-
tiny had been denied to the aged because they had not "experienced a 'history of 
purposeful unequal treatment' [nor had] been subjected to unique disabilities on the 
basis of stereotyped characteristics."122 Where a group's characteristics are relevant to 
interests that the state can legitimately protect, the courts should be reluctant to closely 
scrutinize the legislation. 123 
The Court found that the court of appeals erred because: (1) the reduced capabilities 
of the mentally retarded make them different in relevant respects, therefore, the.state's 
interest is a legitimate one; (2) national and state legislation addressed the unique 
problems of the mentally retarded so that oversight by the courts is unnecessary; (3) the 
great amount of legislative response to the needs of the mentally retarded contradicts 
the argument that they are politically powerless; and (4) if the large and not strictly 
definable class of mentally retarded were deemed "quasi-suspect," it would be difficult 
to distinguish them from other groups such as the aged or disabled who also have 
immutable characteristics. 124 
The Court stated that the mentally retarded did not require quasi-suspect classifi-
cation because they were adequately protected from invidious discrimination under the 
minimum rationality standard.125 Under the minimum rationality standard a "state may 
not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to 
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational."126 The Court applied the minimum ra-
tionality standard to the ordinance in Cleburne which required the respondents to obtain 
a special building permit for a group home to house the mentally retarded. The Court 
found this particular application of the ordinance unconstitutional, but not the ordinance 
itself. Special classification and treatment of the mentally retarded was not rationally 
related to the city'S legitimate governmental purpose in Cleburne. It is conceivable how-
ever, that situations might arise where mental retardation would be rationally related to 
a governmental purpose. 127 
B. The Concurring Opinions 
l. Justice Stevens 
Justice Stevens, with whom Chief Justice Burger joined, criticized the delineation of 
"three clearly defined" standards of review. "I have never been persuaded that these so-
120 ld. (quoting Mills 456 U.S. at 91). 
121ld. (citing Frontiero 411 U.S. at 677 (gender); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 
( 1976)(ilIegitimacy». 
122ld. (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976». 
123ld. 
124ld. at 3256-57. 
125ld. at 3258. 
126ld. (citing Zobel 457 U.S. at 61-63; U.S. Dept. of Agri. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973». 
These cases cited by the Court to define minimum rationality were previously analyzed to show the 
Court using more than minimal scrutiny. 
127 ld. at 3260. 
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called standards adequately explain the decisional process."!28 Justice Stevens stated that 
he personally used a single "rational basis" standard, but defined "rational" to mean: 
"an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legit-
imate public purpose that transcend[ed] the harm to the members of the disadvantaged 
class."!29 According to Justice Stevens, the reason government action affecting "quasi-
suspect" classes is occasionally invalidated is not because of an intermediate level of 
scrutiny, but because "the characteristics of these groups are sometimes relevant and 
sometimes irrelevant to a valid public purpose."130 Mental retardation, according to 
Justice Stevens, is a classification which legislators may rationally take into consideration 
if that difference is relevant to government action. Justice Stevens believed that the city 
of Cleburne denied the permit because of the "irrational fears of neighboring property 
owner," and not because of the need to protect the mentally retarded from "the hazards 
of the neighborhood."!3! Since Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that zoning 
ordinances could not be justified by the city's argument that the discrimination was 
meant to protect the mentally retarded, he concurred in the opinion.!32 
2. Justice Marshall 
Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined, concurred in 
part and dissented in part in the judgment. 133 Justice Marshall agreed that "retardation 
per se cannot be a proxy for depriving retarded people of their rights and interests 
without regard to variations in individual ability." Justice Marshall, however, found fault 
in the Court's reasoning which prompted this result.!34 The test which the Court pro-
posed and the test which it actually applied were different. Under the rational basis test, 
legislation which does not make prima facie classifications to achieve its purpose is 
presumptively valid and not closely scrutinized. 135 Thus, according to Justice Marshall, 
if the Court had used the traditional rational basis test, the city ordinance would likely 
have been upheld since it would be presumptively valid. 
Despite the majority's claim that heightened scrutiny is not required for the mentally 
retarded, in Justice Marshall's opinion, the Court used "precisely the sort of inquiry 
associated with heightened scrutiny."!36 Justice Marshall deemed the majority's test "sec-
ond-order" rational basis scrutiny because under the traditional test, the Court would 
128Id. at 326l. 
129 Id.; See U.S. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980) (Stevens, j., concurring). 
130 City of Cleburne, 105 S.Ct. at 3261-62. In a footnote Justice Stevens suggests comparing Reed 
v. Reed with Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) to demonstrate when 
the characteristic of gender may be constitutionally taken into consideration to establish a class. Id. 
at n.9. 
131 Id. at 3262. Petitioner argued that the location of the group home near a junior high school 
would subject the group home residents to harassment. They also argued that the group home was 
located in a five hundred year old flood plain. Justice Stevens found both reasons unpersuasive. Id. 
at 3263. 
I>2Id. at 3262. 
133Id. 
134Id. 
135Id. at 3264 (citing Williamson, 348 U.S. at 483; Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); 
A.F.L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 
(1935)). 
I36Id. at 3264. 
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have given greater deference to legislative enactment. The majority closely scrutinized 
the record of the lower court. The traditional test, however, does not entail a determi-
nation that policy decisions are supported by a firm factual foundation. U7 Thus, Justice 
Marshall concluded that the Court put the burden of persuasion on the city of Cleburne 
to show that the classification was reasonable rather than following the minimum ration-
ality practice of presuming legislation to be constitutional.Is8 As Justice Marshall recog-
nized, the majority states that it used a rational basis review, but in effect they applied a 
closer scrutiny. Since the Court did use a closer scrutiny, Justice Marshall believed that 
the Court should expressly state that intermediate scrutiny is used to review state action 
affecting the mentally retarded in order to avoid confusion in future decisions. The 
mislabelling of the test used by the majority has two negative implications: (1) the 
traditional rational basis test will now allow the searching inquiry the Court gave the 
Cleburne record, and (2) the Court gave no indication of what factors trigger the more 
searching inquiry that it performed. In all likelihood, the analysis in Cleburne will only 
confuse lower courts in the future}S9 
Justice Marshall's preferred standard of review for equal protection cases would 
"vary with 'the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected 
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classificaton is 
drawn'."l4o 
When a zoning ordinance works to exclude the retarded from all residential 
districts in a community, these two considerations require that the ordinance 
be convincingly justified as substantially furthering legitimate and important 
purposes. 141 
Applying this heightened scrutiny test to the facts of the Cleburne case, Justice 
Marshall first determined that the mentally retarded have a substantial, if not funda-
mental, interest in "the right to 'establish a home'."142 Forbidding the group home 
deprived the mentally retarded of "what makes for human freedom and fulfillment -
the ability to form bonds and take part in the life of a community."14s Second, Justice 
Marshall noted that the mentally retarded, like other suspect classes, have a history of 
legal and social segregation and discrimination. 144 Justice Marshall detailed the history 
of the "grotesque" treatment of the mentally retarded in the United States. He explained 
the ways in which the mentally retarded had been victims of de jure discrimination, 
"eugenic marriage and sterilization laws that extinguished for the retarded one of the 
'basic civil rights of man' - the right to marry and procreate."145 In addition, other 
fundamental rights were denied by laws which prevented the mentally retarded from 
IS7Id. (citing e.g., Exxon Corp., 462 U.S. at 196; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 
456,461-62,464 (1981); Firemen v. Chicago R.l. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1968)). 
IS8Id. at 3265. 
J59ld. 
14°ld. (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, ]., dissenting); Plyler 457 U.S. at 230-31 
(Marshall]., concurring); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970)(Marshall]., dissenting)). 
IOl/d. 
1.2Id. 
I'Sld. at 3266. 
1··ld. 
I,sld. at 3266-67. Marshall noted that Kentucky, Michigan and Mississippi continue to have 
laws which make marriages of the mentally retarded either voidable or a criminal offense. Id. at 
n.12. 
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voting or receiving a public education. According to Marshall, since the mentally retarded 
have a history of discrimination which has resulted in the loss of their fundamental 
rights, the Court should use greater scrutiny than is required by the rational basis test 
to review state action affecting the mentally retarded. 146 
Moreover, Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's justifications for using the 
minimum rationality standard because he believed that the mentally retarded were 
"politically powerless."147 Although constitutional principles of equality have changed 
over time, and legislatures might be cognizant of these changed principles, Marsball 
indicated that this was not sufficient justification to reduce the level of scrutiny applied. 148 
[R]ace-based classifications [did not become] any less suspect once extensive 
legislation had been enacted on the subject •.. Heightened judicial scrutiny 
of action appearing to impose unnecessary barriers to the retarded is re-
quired in light of increasing recognition that such barriers are inconsist.ent 
with evolving principles of equality embedded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 149 
Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's determination that intermediate scru-
tiny should not be used when legislative classifications affecting the group are more 
likely to be valid. First. although some mentally retarded persons have reduced capacities 
which at times may be considered relevant by legislatures. this did not justify the consis-
tent use of re~rdation as a reason to place men~lly retarded persons in a separate 
class)50 Second, the majority asserted that the standard of review depends upon the 
frequency that the legislature could legitimately take the characteristic into considera-
tion. 151 Justice Marshall found this illogical because in cases where gender and alienage 
are relevant characteristics, the Court consistently .applies intermediate review. 152 How-
ever, whether or not mental retardation is a relevant characteristic. the Court will apply 
a minimal review. 
The fact that retardation may be deemed a constitutional irrelevancy in 
some circumstances is enough, given the history of discrimination the retarded 
have suffered. to require careful judicial review of classifications singling out 
the retarded for special burdens (emphasis added).15s 
The majority admitted that discrimination of the mentally retarded continued to 
exist; but because the vast majority of legislation which singled out the mentally retarded 
was legitimate. intermediate scrutiny was not required. 154 Justice Marshall argued that it 
was "constitutional principles" and not the number of "invalid situations" which "trig-
gered" intermediate scrutiny.155 
146Id. at 3267. 
147/d. at 3268. 
14sld. 
149/d. at 3269. 
ISO Id. 
151 Id. at 3270. 
IS2Id. 
ISS Id. 
1541d. at 3271. 
ISSld. at 3270. 
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In addition, Justice Marshall stated that intermediate review was appropriate for 
the mentally retarded because a court would not necessarily second guess legislative or 
professional judgment. Intermediate scrutiny would ensure that such judgments were 
not the products of prejudicial thoughtlessness or stereotypes which might "offend 
principles of equality found in the Fourteenth Amendment."156 Legislation concerning 
the mentally retarded would not be presumptively valid, but a state would not need to 
show a compelling state interest in order for the legislation to be valid. 
In applying intermediate scrutiny to the Cleburne ordinance, Justice Marshall would 
have struck down the ordinance rather than merely invalidate its application to respon-
dents. 157 Justice Marshall criticized the majority opinion for leaving the "sweeping exclu-
sion of the 'feeble-minded'" to be applied to other retarded groups in the future, without 
any guidance for valid application of the ordinance. l58 Justice Marshall stated that the 
Court would have been consistent with Supreme Court precedent had it invalidated 
Cleburne's vastly overbroad ordinance. Thus, the city would have been forced to modify 
the unconstitutional ordinance. Justice Marshall concluded that the effect of the majority 
opinion would force the mentally retarded to continually face the obstacles created by 
the zoning ordinance. The Court's failure to distinguish between permissible and im-
permissible applications of laws affecting the mentally retarded creates confusing and 
ambiguous precedent. 159 
Justice Marshall concluded that of ultimate importance was not the standard of 
review used, but the identification of interests at stake and the articulation of the 
principles underlying the classifications. These state interests and justifications must be 
carefully examined to ascertain whether they are based upon past prejudice or miscon-
ceptions. l60 
V. THE MENTALLY RETARDED REQUIRE AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY 
A. State Action Protects and Denies the Rights of the Mentally Retarded 
The rule of Cleburne is inadequate to assure equal protection of law for the mentally 
retarded. The majority neglected to recognize that the mentally retarded continue to be 
,d«:prived of fundamental rights through state law and state action. Justice Marshall, 
'~?;~fiver, realistically recognized the need for the application of intermediate scrutiny to 
the laws affecting the mentally retarded. 161 The Supreme Court has ruled consistently 
that citlz,ens have fundamental rights to marriage and procreation. 162 As the Court stated 
inSkinn~~ v. Oklahoma: 163 
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival 
.Qf,the race ... There is no exception for the individual whom the law touches. 
, .. ~ . 
156Id. at 3271. 
157Id. at 3272. 
158/d. 
159Id. at 3273. 
160/d. at 3275. 
1611d. at 3266-67. Marshall discussed the lost rights to marry, procreate and vote. 
162 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
( 1973)(abortion). 
16' 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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Any experiment [referring to the sterilization of certain types of criminals] 
which the state conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived 
of a basic liberty.I64 
Traditionally, when other groups have been denied constitutionally guaranteed rights, 
the Court has used a closer standard of review than minimum scrutiny. The mentally 
retarded, however, continue to be deprived of these fundamental rights through statutes 
which either prohibit or restrict marriages and reproduction among the mentally re-
tarded. I65 Still the Court in Cleburne held that in cases dealing with the mentally retarded 
only a minimum rationality test would be used because the mentally retarded are not a 
quasi-suspect class. The declaration by the Court that the mentally retarded are not a 
quasi-suspect class could negatively affect the mentally retarded in future Supreme Court 
and lower court cases in which there is a potential deprivation of fundamental rights. If 
a state can show a "rational relation to a legitimate government purpose," then the Court 
will not further scrutinize the statute to discover concomitant discriminatory purposes 
or effects. I66 
There is no reasonable support for laws which prohibit only the mentally retarded 
from marrying. Common law arguments maintained that a contract, such as a marriage 
contract, was void or voidable if the parties to the contract lacked the capacity to 
understand the contract. I67 A somewhat antiquated legitimate government purpose, 
therefore, was to protect the mentally retarded from entering a marriage contract when 
they inherently lacked the capacity to comprehend the meaning of marriage. The fear 
of the legislature, however, was not that the mentally retarded would marry, but that 
the mentally retarded would reproduce. I6s Although the old arguments were based upon 
eugenic theories, a state could use other reasons to justify prohibiting the mentally 
retarded from reproducing because: (1) the mentally retarded are themselves unable to 
adequately care for their children; and (2) if permitted, the mentally retarded will only 
create more mentally retarded who will have to be cared for by the state. I69 Given that 
a distinction between mentally retarded persons and non-mentally retarded persons 
need only be supported by a rational basis, a court might be reluctant to look beyond 
these possible justifications which, on the surface, appear to be protecting the health and 
safety of citizens, but in actuality may be over-inclusive and continuing discrimination 
of the mentally retarded. As discussed earlier, it is inaccurate to assume that all forms 
of mental retardation are transmissable. The justification that the mentally retarded 
would be unfit parents is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Not all mentally 
retarded individuals would necessarily be unfit parents since many mentally retarded 
persons are educable. I70 Moreover, other non-retarded persons may be unfit to be 
parents, but nonetheless are not prohibited from reproducing. 
164 [d. at 541. 
165 Thirty-eight states have laws which infringe upon the mentally retarded's right to marry. 
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.030 (Supp. 1976). Thirteen states maintain sterilization 
laws which affect the mentally retarded's right to procreate. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-37 
(1976 and Supp. 1981). 
166 Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488. 
167 See Shaman, supra note 39, at 73. 
168 Note, The Right of the Mentally Disabled to Marry: A Statutory Evaluation, 15 J. FAM. L. 463, 
467-69 (1977). 
169 [d. at 466. 
170 Sherlock & Sherlock, supra note 42, at 962. 
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Initially the enactment of sterilization laws was encouraged because of false assump-
tions that the mentally retarded population was growing at a faster rate than the "normal" 
population. Generally these laws were enacted because of stereotypes which characterized 
the mentally retarded as having no morals or sexual self-control. l7l In the last decade 
of the nineteenth century, sterilization operations became feasible. With the growth of 
the eugenic movement many states enacted compulsory sterilization laws. 172 The state 
sterilization laws focused primarily on three classes of individuals: the mentally retarded, 
the insane and the epileptic.173 
Despite the seemingly harsh consequences of sterilization, situations could arise 
where an unwanted pregnancy would inflict physical or psychological harm on the 
mentally retarded individual, or where a child would be neglected because of a mentally 
retarded individual's incapacities. In these situations, the state would ultimately bear the 
burden of the unwanted pregnancy.174 Sterilization operations should be performed 
when appropriate, but prior to granting a sterilization order, the Court should carefully 
weigh the reasons for the sterilization against the fundamental interests of the individual. 
B. State Court Review of Sterilization Orders 
Ironically, despite the occasional unconstitutional treatment of the mentally retarded 
by law, state courts when granting or denying petitions for sterilization use much closer 
scrutiny than would be required under the minimum rationality standard used by the 
Supreme Court in Clebume. 175 
When deciding on sterilization petitions, a majority of state courts are guided by 
applicable statutes. There are primarily two types of statutes: (1) statutes which provide 
initial non-judicial review by a board to determine the advisability of sterilization, 176 and 
(2) statutes which grant judicial determination in the first instance.177 The statutes have 
a variety of rationales and requirements for findings of fact. The argument can be made 
that courts should rely upon statutes rather than create their own guidelines, since 
"[i]nvoluntary sterilization is a complete and irreversible taking of a basic human right."17s 
Courts should not be expected to provide all of the answers, rather there should be 
discussion and decision in the public domain. It is consistent with this argument that the 
171 Gould, supra note 27",at 361. The two most common procedures used were the vasectomy 
on males and the salpingectomy on females. The first recorded sterilization was performed in the 
United States in 1889, and state institutions began performing them in 1899. [d. 
172 See generally Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-Evaluation, 14 J. FAM. 
L. 280 (1975). 
173 [d. For background on the eugenics movement in general, see NEEL & SCHULL, HUMAN 
HEREDITY (1954); 2 SCHWARTZ, NATURE's CORRECTIVE PRINCIPLE IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION: THE HIS-
TORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION (1976); Sorenson, From Social Movement to Clinical Medicine - The 
Role of Law and the Medical Profession in Regulating Applied Human Genetics, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 
(1976). 
174 Ross, supra note 65, at 612-24. 
175 See, e.g., Matter of Hillstrom, 363 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Minn. 1985)(court used strict scrutiny 
to review granting of sterilization). 
176 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to 41-45-19 (1972). 
177 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-42 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 27-16-1 (1980). Some state statutes only 
apply to institutionalized individuals such as the laws of Delaware, Mississippi, South Carolina and 
Utah. At least one district court indicated that such a law may violate equal protection. See Ruby v. 
Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978). 
178 Linn, supra note 12, at 39. 
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majority of state courts refuse to grant a sterilization order when no statutes authorize 
jurisdiction. 179 
In a growing minority of states, however, courts of equity use their own discretion 
in granting or denying petitions for sterilization. The two standards of review used by 
these courts are: (1) the state must show by "clear and convincing evidence" that steril-
ization is in the best interests of and medically essential to the mentally retarded indi-
vidual,I8o or (2) the court will use "substituted judgment" by deciding for the incompetent 
what he would have decided were he competent. I81 
In general, this minority view is criticized because of the variety of standards used 
by the courts and differing interpretations given to these standards. 182 Although judicial 
discretion may allow courts the flexibility to decide on a case by case basis, legislative 
guidance is argued to be the better way to protect mentally retarded individuals. In the 
public forum, there is a chance for competing interests to ensure that the proper 
authority protects the best interests and constitutional rights of the mentally retarded 
individual while protecting the health and safety of all of its citizens. I83 
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Under the "clear and convincing" standard, two tests are generally conducted in 
determining the sufficiency of proof: (1) the medical necessity test, and (2) the best 
interests test. To demonstrate a medical necessity, there must be sufficient proof to show 
that sterilization will preserve the life or health of the individual. To meet the "best 
interests" test, three elements are generally considered: (1) the inability of the mentally 
retarded to consent; (2) the capacity of the individual to reproduce and the likelihood 
of sexual activity; and (3) the existence of a less restrictive means of birth control. I84 
Where consent is considered, some state courts base their decisions on whether consent 
was given by the parent, guardian or the individual himself. I85 Considering parental or 
179 See, e.g., Matter of A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash.2d 
278, 608 P.2d 635 (1980). See also Comment, Sterilization Petitions: Developing Judicial Patterns, 44 
MONT. L. REV. 127 (1983); Gould, supra note 27, at 373 n.159. 
180 Sherlock & Sherlock, supra note 42, at 966. The "best interests" test is usually used in child 
custody and support litigation. It presents advantages over other tests for sufficiency of proof 
because it focuses on the particular person and it can be applied in a variety of situations. 
181Id. A patient's "inability to consent" is often difficult to determine because of varying levels 
of mental retardation and because of an individual's potential of improvement. It is difficult to 
predict if the individual could develop sufficient understanding and judgment to take care of his 
own needs. 
Variations occur in this standard. For example, North Carolina courts also consider the likeli-
hood that the mentally retarded individual will engage in sexual activity that would result in 
pregnancy. See Matter of Truesdell, 329 S.E.2d 630 (N.C. 1985). Some courts require an almost 
impossible showing that the individual's disability could not be treated in the near future. Less 
drastic alternatives to sterilization are also considered, such as the feasibility of other birth control 
methods which would be less intrusive or reversible. See generally Struble, Protection of the Mentally 
Retarded Individual's Right to Choose Sterilization: The Effect of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 
12 CAP. L. REV. 413 (1983). 
182 Struble, supra note 181, at 418-33. 
183 Sherlock & Sherlock, supra note 42, at 966. 
184 See, e.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375-76 (Colo. 1981). 
185 See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,41,355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). But see Hillstrom, 363 N.W.2d 
at 876 (substituted consent of guardian not sufficient to be considered voluntary consent of indi-
vidual); In re Eberhardy, lO2 Wis.2d 539, 573-74, 307 N.W.2d 881, 897 (1981). 
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guardian consent to be the actual voluntary consent of the mentally retarded individual 
is fictional at best. The danger remains that such sterilization is not in the best interests 
of the child or ward. IB6 One writer commented that actually gaining the voluntary consent 
of the mentally retarded individual is unlikely because the individual may not understand 
the implications of consent. That individual might consent merely to gain the acceptance 
ofthose advocating the sterilization, or more likely he may not understand an explanation 
of the alternatives. IB7 
Clear and convincing evidence is a less demanding standard, but it ensures funda-
mental fairness and protects individual liberties against governmental invasion. The 
standard is used when there is a great degree of governmental intrusion and a need to 
protect the private interest because a substantial injury would result from an erroneous 
decision. The potential injury to the individual through sterilization is greater than the 
potential harm to society. Therefore, the two parties should not bear the risk of error 
equally. Making the state prove, however, "beyond a reasonable doubt" would be too 
great a burden for what might in some instances be necessary medical treatment. 
The clear and convincing evidence standard should only be used when the state 
seeks to deprive fundamental rights by forcing a sterilization operation. Although a state 
might legitimately seek to protect the individual's right to choose sterilization, it risks 
depriving an individual of the fundamental right to procreate where that individual does 
not have the capacity to choose. 
2. Substituted Judgment 
The substituted judgment standard calls for the court to "don the mental mantle of 
the incompetent" and substitute itself as the individual in the decision-making process. IBB 
The court does not necessarily make the "best" decision, but attempts to make the 
decision the individual would have made had he been competent. The substituted 
judgment standard was used by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Matter of 
Moe lB9 to protect the fundamental rights involved in a sterilization decision. The court 
sought "to protect the incompetent person within its power, ... recognize the dignity 
and worth of such a person and afford to that person the same panoply of rights and 
choices it recognizes in competent persons."190 
The court in Moe first stressed a need for careful adherence to established procedure 
and then listed the various fac!ors to be considered in making a decision to sterilize 
when using the substituted judgment doctrine. The factors the court should consider 
186 Soskin, Voluntary Steriliwtion: Safeguarding Freedom of Choice, 2 AMICUS 40, 42 (1977). For 
medical treatment, most states require informed consent using a "reasonable patient standard." 
There must be sufficient information given concerning the treatment, the risks involved, the possible 
consequences and the available alternatives. 
Courts have found a lack of consent where an individual's reasoning was impaired by mental 
retardation. See Gould, supra note 27, at 366 n.79 . 
• 187 See Soskin, supra note 186, at 141. 
188 Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982). This doctrine is also used for organ 
donations and transplants from the mentally retarded. See Strunk v. Strunk, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 
1968); Robertson, Organ Donations by the Incompetent and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. 
L. REV. 48 (1976). 
189 Moe, 385 Mass. at 555, 432 N.E.2d at 712. 
190Id. at 563-64, 432 N .E.2d at 719, (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 
Mass. 728, 746, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977». 
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are: (1) whether the individual lacks the capacity to make his own decision or that his 
condition is likely to change; (2) the individual's physical ability to procreate; (3) the 
possibility and effectiveness of less intrusive means of birth control; (4) the medical 
necessity - which will depend upon the facts of each case; (5) the nature and extent of 
the disability, i.e., how well the individual could care for a child were he/she to have one; 
(6) the likelihood of engaging in sexual activity that would result in pregnancy; (7) the 
possible psychological risks that would stem from either pregnancy or sterilization; (8) 
the religious beliefs of the individual or other special circumstances.191 
The court in Moe preferred the substituted judgment standard because the clear 
and convincing evidence standard required too great a burden of proof on the party 
petitioning for sterilization, and according to the court, no sterilization would ever be 
authorized. 192 Therefore, the court held that even absent a statute providing authori-
zation, a probate court could order sterilization of a mentally retarded individual using 
the factors indicated. 195 
A "growing minority" of state courts currently use the substituted judgment doc-
trine. l94 Advocates of this doctrine argue that it maintains an individual's integrity 
because it provides a forum in which the question of sterilization can be decided, rather 
than autom~tically dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction. 195 Critics claim, however, that 
the court gives itself an "impossible task" of trying to determine what would be the 
wishes of a severely retarded individual were he competent. 196 The dissent in Moe 
described the attempt as a "cruel charade" since there is no way for a judge to validly 
ascertain the wants or desires of such an individual. Thus, in reality the choice is that of 
thejudge. 197 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should use intermediate scrutiny for state action affecting the 
mentally retarded. The Court should use a higher standard than minimum rationality 
because, as state courts have recognized, the mentally retarded have been and continue 
to be deprived of fundamental rights. Sterilization of the mentally retarded is one area 
of potential deprivation of fundamental rights. In response, state courts have chosen 
either to follow legislative guidelines where they exist or to create judicial guidelines. In 
1911d. at 566, 432 N.E.2d at 721-22. In addition to the factors considered, the court stated that 
a guardian ad litem should be appointed, and at the discretion of the judge, another attorney for 
the ward must be appointed to ensure "rough adversary exploration of the question to sterilize." 
ld. at 567, 432 N.E.2d at 722. A judge should also appoint, at his discretion, independent medical 
and psychological experts for the purpose of examining the ward and making a report to the court. 
ld. 
1921d. at 566-70, 432 N.E.2d at 721-24. 
19' ld. at 571-72, 432 N.E.2d at 724. 
194 Struble, supra note 181, at 414 n.8. 
1951d. 
196 Moe, 385 Mass. at 572, 432 N.E.2d at 724 (Nolan j., dissenting). The dissent suggests that 
a judge in a sterilization case should also enter a detailed written report with his or her judgment 
indicating the factors which were persuasive. See also Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.S.2d 363, 380 
(1981)(court thought it unrealistic to use substituted judgment when the individual was incompetent 
since birth). 
1971d. 
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either case, courts closely examine sterilization cases and weigh the interests of both the 
mentally retarded individual and the state. 
The most recent Supreme Court decision concerning the mentally retarded, City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,198 has two contradictory results. The decision creates 
confusion for lower courts, but indicates a willingness of the Court to raise the scrutiny 
level for the mentally retarded given a different set of facts. The Cleburne opinion is 
confusing because it espouses a rational basis test, even though the Court closely scru-
tinized the facts. Lower courts may interpret the Supreme Court's opinion literally and 
use the traditional rational basis test to review government action concerning the mentally 
retarded. Consequently, in the case of a sterilization order, a court might uphold a statute 
depriving mentally retarded persons of fundamental rights under the rational basis test, 
whereas a statute similarly affecting non-retarded persons would receive close scrutiny. 
In addition, the decision in Cleburne indicates that where a clear deprivation of a 
mentally retarded individual's fundamental rights is the main issue, it is likely that a 
majority of the Supreme Court will use a higher level scrutiny than the Court used in 
Cleburne. Justice Stevens, with whom former Chief Justice Burger joined although he 
concurred with the majority, suggests that the level of review is of little consequence; 
instead the court should inquire as to the motive behind state action}99 Justice Marshall, 
with whom Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined, states outright that the mentally 
retarded require intermediate scrutiny and that the Cleburne decision departs from equal 
protection precedent.20o Together, these five members of the Court could, in a case 
concerning fundamental rights, form the majority that would raise both in substance 
and in name the level of scrutiny used for the mentally retarded and correctly establish 
them as a quasi-suspect class. 
Marie Appleby 
198 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed. 2d 313 (1985). 
199 City of Cleburne, 105 S.Ct. at 3261-63 (Stevens, j. concurring). "The record convinces me 
that this permit was required because of the irrational fears of neighboring property owners, rather 
than for the protection of the mentally retarded persons who would reside in respondent's home." 
Id. 
200Id. at 3272 (Marshall, j., concurring and dissenting). 
